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It is my function to provide a brief survey of the history and purpose of
the attorney-client privilege with special reference to its availability to cor-
porations. I shall not attempt an original exposition. Instead, I shall attempt
to summarize for you some of the extensive writings and significant cases
which have dealt with our topic, in the hope that I can provide a general
outline which can serve as a backdrop for the more practical insights into the
current problems in the field which will be provided by my two distinguished
colleagues on this panel.
Dean Wigmore has tersely summarized the essential requirements for the
attorney-client privilege:
(i) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived. 1
The privilege seems first to have been recognized in the Sixteenth Century.
There was no need for it at an earlier time because courts lacked the power
to compel witnesses to testify until the reign of Elizabeth I. Originally, the
privilege seemed to be based upon the honor of the attorney and belonged
to the attorney who could waive it. During the Eighteenth Century, the
courts found a new rationale in protecting the client from apprehension that
his confidences might be betrayed. By the middle of the Nineteenth Century,
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it was recognized that the privilege belonged to the client. At first it existed
only when a confidence had been communicated to a lawyer during litiga-
tion. Ultimately it extended to any consultation for legal advice. 2 The pur-
pose of the privilege is expressed well in a comment to the Model Code of
Evidence:
•.. In a society as complicated in structure as ours and governed by
laws as complex and detailed as those imposed upon us, expert legal
advice is essential. To the furnishing of such advice the fullest free-
dom and honesty of communication of pertinent facts is a prerequi-
site. To induce clients to make such communication, the privilege to
prevent their later disclosure is said by courts and commentators to be
a necessity. The social good derived from the proper performance of
the functions of lawyers acting for their clients is believed to outweigh
the harm that may come from the suppression of the evidence in spe-
cific cases.3
The privilege has undergone periodic attack by academicians of repute-
Bentham, Morgan, McCormick, Radin, to name a few.4 But the bar and the
bench have been consistently alert to any attempt to narrow its scope.
Prior to 1962 there was no case which denied the availability of the privi-
lege to a corporation if the requirements of the privilege were met.5 An im-
pressive line of cases assumed that a corporation could assert the privilege.6
The American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence 7 and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence s included corporations in the definition of clients who
could assert the privilege. Hence, two decisions by Chief Judge Campbell of
the Northern District of Illinois which denied the availability of the privi-
lege to a corporation in the Radiant Burners cases9 came as a considerable
shock to most of us who thought the matter was free from doubt.
Chief Judge Campbell reasoned that (1) historically the attorney-client
privilege, like the privilege against self-incrimination, was intended to be
available only to natural persons; (2) the essential requirement of confiden-
tiality could not exist within a corporation which necessarily must operate
through agents; and (3) the visitatorial powers of the state weaken the bases
for the assertion of the privilege by a corporation.10
There followed a brief period of considerable consternation, high-lighted
by a number of highly critical comments in the law reviews. 11 The furor sub-
sided, however, when the Seventh Circuit reversed Radiant Burners.'2 The
opinion made clear what most observers has assumed previously-that, unlike
the privilege against self-incrimination, the attorney-client privilege does not
exist out of deference to a personal right, but as a rule to facilitate the work-
ing of justice. Specifically, the court held:
A corporation is entitled to the same treatment as any other "client"
-no more and no less. If it seeks legal advice from an attorney, and
in that relationship confidentially communicates information relating
to the advice sought, it may protect itself from disclosure, absent its
waiver thereof. 13
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There seems little chance that Chief Judge Campbell's views will experi-
ence a renaissance. However, Radiant Burners has had a profound influence
on the attitude of courts towards the assertion of the privilege. The reasons
suggested by Judge Campbell as a basis for his conclusion that the privilege
is never available to a corporation have been utilized by other courts to test
the assertion of the privilege in particular cases. There seems to be a dear
recognition that the difference between a corporation and a natural person
affects whether in a given case a communication can be appropriately char-
acterized as that of a corporation rather than its agent. There seems to be
little doubt that the privilege will not be available to allow a corporation
to immunize its records from disclosure by placing its papers and documents
in the hands of its lawyers for custodial purposes. Nor is there any tendency
by the courts to extend the privilege to business advice simply because it is
given by a lawyer.
The cases provide some illuminating examples of the difficulty in deter-
mining when the privilege exists.
An initial question sometimes involves the issue of whether the corpora-
tion is the client when information is communicated to a lawyer by an agent
of the corporation. In some cases, the agent may be only a witness; in others
he may be speaking as the representative of the corporation. What test should
be applied to determine whether the communication is privileged as to the
corporation?
There have been suggestions that the client is the corporation whenever
any agent originates a communication for the advice of company counsel on
a matter concerning the interests of the corporation.1 4 Other decisions would
stop short of all agents, but would clearly permit a fairly broad group to
speak for the corporation.1 Others have suggested that the test should be
whether the agent's communication related to his corporate responsibilities'1 6
On occasion it has been suggested that the rank in the corporation of the
employee making the communication should be the determinant. 17 Several
courts have formulated a standard in terms of power to control.' 8 In City of
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Judge Kirkpatrick stated the
test in these terms:
Keeping in mind that the question is, Is it the corporation which is
seeking the lawyer's advice when the asserted privileged communica-
tion is made?, the most satisfactory solution, I think, is that if the em-
ployee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in
a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision
about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of
the attorney, or if he is an authorized member of a body or group
which has the authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the cor-
poration when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege
would apply. In all other cases the employee would be merely giving
information to the lawyer to enable the latter to advise those in the
corporation having the authority to act or refrain from acting on the
advice.' 9
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Thus, in a matter of overwhelming importance to a corporation, a depart-
ment or division head might not be able to speak for the corporation, while
in cases where an employee is actually authorized to make a decision after
consultation with counsel-as, for example, the head of a claims department
dealing with a minor personal injury claim-a communication to an attorney
concerning the matter would be privileged as to the corporation. 2 0 The state-
ment of an agency outside the "control group" would simply be that of a
witness. The corporation might still resist discovery on the "work product"
concept of Hickman v. Taylor,2 1 but the statement would not be privileged.
The "control group" test has been vigorously criticized. 2 2 It has been
pointed out that the adoption of such a test may mean that outside counsel
who engages in internal investigations as a part of a vigorous program of
anti-trust compliance, may be developing evidence against a client when he
exchanges communications with corporate agents who are not within the
control group. 23 Furthermore the test seems to deny the privilege to the cor-
poration when the communication is made by middle management execu-
tives who may not qualify for inclusion in the control group, but who have
responsibilities for making recommendations which are frequently ratified
perfunctorily by higher management.2 4
A second problem deals with the requirements of confidentiality. A com-
munication which was not made in confidence, as when an oral communica-
tion is made in the presence of strangers, or a written communication is
distributed generally throughout a corporation, will not be privileged. A
corporation must operate through agents and, therefore, some agents of the
croporations are necessarily privy to any communication with the attorney
for the corporation. However, it does not follow that a communication may
be disclosed indiscriminately within the corporation and still be protected.
The best standard seems to recognize that disclosure may be made within the
corporation on a "need-to-know" basis without destroying the privilege.2 5
It should, of course, be recognized that a communication which was orginally
confidential and thus privileged, may lose its status by subsequently being
broadcast to a larger constituency. Indeed, it has been held that the privi-
lege may be lost by filing a document in the general files of the corporation.2 6
A third problem area involves the kind of advice which is sought or given.
The privilege applies only when legal advice is sought from a professional
legal adviser who is acting in that capacity. Normally, there is no problem
when the ordinary citizen consults a lawyer. Frequently, however, lawyers
render commercial and even technical advice to corporations in addition to
advice concerning the law. Thus, it is sometimes necessary for the courts to
characterize a communication as one seeking or providing business advice,
and thus not privileged, or one seeking legal advice and, therefore, within
the protection of the privilege.2 7 Frequently, however, the advice of a lawyer
may involve mixed legal-business advice. As Judge Wysanski has pointed out:
The modern lawyer almost invariably advises his client upon not
only what is permissible but also what is desirable. And it is in the
public interest that the lawyer should regard himself as more than
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predicter of legal consequences. His duty to society as well as to his
client involves many relevant social, economic, political, and philo-
sophical considerations. And the privilege of nondisclosure is not lost
merely because relevant nonlegal considerations are expressly stated
in a communication which also includes legal advice. 28
If predominantly legal advice is sought or given, the fact that business ad-
vice is also contained in the communication should not affect the privilege.29
But where a communication neither invited nor expressed any legal opinion
or where the advice sought or given is largely of a business nature, the com-
munication will not be protected. 30
The problems seem to have arisen chiefly in cases involving house counsel
and patent lawyers. Mr. Withrow will discuss the status of the patent lawyer.
It has been suggested that the privilege should not apply where house
counsel are involved.3' An argument can be made for the proposition that
no incentive to disclosure is needed when the attorney is himself an officer of
the corporation. However, it seems probable that there would be much
greater reluctance in confiding in house counsel if there were no privilege.
The need for frequent advice of counsel who is readily accessible provides
a cogent reason for encouraging the use of house counsel.3 2
The fact that house counsel are paid annual salaries, occupy the corpora-
tion's buildings, are employees rather than independent contractors, and
give advice to one regular client rather than a number of clients are not
significant distinguishing characteristics insofar as the availability of the
privilege is concerned.3 3 Consequently, the courts have refused to deny cate-
gorically the availability of the privilege to the corporation-house counsel
communication. 34
Whether the privilege applies to a communication to or from house coun-
sel should depend primarily upon the function performed by the attorney
in gathering or preparing the material in question. The suggestion has been
made that whether a lawyer could receive a privileged communication de-
pends on the relative amount of time spent in the role of attorney as com-
pared to the amount of time spent in business affairs.3 5 A preferable approach
would examine the function he performed with reference to each individual
communication, appreciating that a lawyer who spends most of his time
giving business advice may be consulted on some matters solely for legal
assistance.36
Several distinguished commentators have made some cogent suggestions of
administrative techniques to minimize the danger that the privilege would
not protect communication to and from house counsel.3 7 I have consolidated
their suggestions into one list:
i. Place legal responsibility of the corporation under one person.
Patent counsel, tax counsel, claims counsel, and others in organ-
izational responsibility should be under the supervision of the
chief legal attorney.
2. Use legal titles for legal personnel.
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3. Adopt special law department stationery, separate from com-
pany's business stationery.
4. Distinguish legal from business advice and label legal advice by
an appropriate legend.
5. Be careful of sequence. Obtain reports directly and not indi-
rectly.38
6. Segregate law department files and office files. Confidential com-
munications should not be maintained in general files.
7. Communicate to as few people as possible. Corporate conferences
at which confidential communication or legal advice is sought
should be limited to necessary personnel who have a high degree
of responsibility for the subject matter.
8. Where possible, each legal communication should be set up to
deal with a single legal problem, preferably with facts and busi-
ness problems set up and predicated for legal conclusions.
9. Beware of the copying machine. Mr. Thomas Austern goes so far
as to recommend that the original be marked "Legal Opinion-
Not to Be Copied-Return to Legal Division." 39
io. Adopt and enforce record retention schedules. Mr. Austern sug-
gests the acoption of "an accelerated program of document dis-
positions." He suggests that the rule should be that "in a docu-
mentary garden, an annual is not a perennial."40
11. Where possible, have attorneys admitted to local bar. Nonmem-
bership has been held "highly probative" of the absence of the
privilege.41
These matters have not been the subject of as extensive litigation during
the last few years as during the 1962-1964 period. The problem area has
shifted to the issue of Garner42 which Mr. Brereton will discuss. The prob-
lems to which I have briefly alluded cannot be answered by a formula. There
is the constant conflict between the policy which seeks to ascertain the truth,
and that which attempts to encourage the use of legal advice through the
device of the privilege. The more deeply one is convinced of the social neces-
sity of permitting corporations to consult frankly and privately with legal
advisers the more willing one should be to accord them a flexible and gen-
erous privilege. 43 The more convinced one is that the privilege is being used
as a shield by the corporation to preclude access to the truth by immunizing
vast quantities of relevant evidence, the more restrictive will be interpreta-
tion given to the privilege. In the long run, we may see a difference of atti-
tude demonstrated in the "private" cases involving routine discovery than
in the "public" cases involving government regulation. Only time will tell.
236 THE RECORD
FOOTNOTES
1 8 Wigmore §2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961). A more elaborate and somewhat
different formulation is found in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
2 The history of the privilege is concisely summarized in Gardner, A Re-evalua-
tion of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 VIII L. REv. 279, 286-304 (1963). See also
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association, 32o F.2d 314, 323 (7 th Cir.
1963).
3 A.L.I., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Comment Rule 210 (1942).
4 See Gardner, supra n. 2 at 304-316.
5 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association, supra n. 2 at 319.
6 Ibid.
7 A.L.I., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 209 (1942).
8 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 26(3) (1953).
9 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.
1962), 2o9 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
10 Ibid., see Maurer, Privileged Communications and the Corporate Counsel, 28
ALA. LAW 352, 367-69 (1967); Gardner, A Personal Privilege for Communications of
Corporate Clients-Paradox or Public Policy, 40 U. DET. L.J. 299, (1963).
11 The most significant comments are collected in the Radiant Burners opinion,
supra n. 2, at 321; Maurer, supra n. io at 368-69.
12 See n. 2, supra.
13 32o F.2d 314, 324.
14 See Comment, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations,
the Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 NW. U. L. REV. 235, 242 (1961).
15 See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., supra n. I; Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Radio Corporation of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del. 1954).
16 Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer, 56 ILL. BAR J. 542 (1968).
17 This contention was made in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 21o F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa., 1962).
18 City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. supra n. 17, Garrison v.
General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963), Day v. Illinois Power Co.,
50 Ill. App. 2d 52, 199 N.E.2d 8o2 (1964).
19 21o F. Supp. 483.485.
20 Ibid. at 486.
21 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
22 See Burnham, supra n. 16, at 545-48; Heininger, The Attorney-Client Privilege
As It Relates to Corporations, 53 ILL. BAR J. 376, 384 (1965).
23 Burnham, supra n. 16, at 548.
24 Maurer, supra n. io at 375.
25 See Comment, 56 NW. U. L. REv. 235, supra n. 14 at 248.
26 See United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954);
Cote v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 16o Misc. 658, 29o N.Y. Supp. 483 (N.Y. Munic. Ct.
1936); cf. Fey v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 19 F.R.D. 526 (D. Neb. 1956).
27 See United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751 (D. Del. 1943).
28 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., supra n. s, at 359-
29 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corporation of America, supra n. 15 at 794.
30 Ibid.
31 Wise v. Western Union Telegraph Co. 36 Del. (6 Harr.) 456, 178 Atl. 640 (1935).
See Gardner, supra n. 1o, at 354-362.
ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE 237
32 See Comment, 56 N.W. U. L. REV. 235, supra n. 14 at 246-47.
33 United States V. United Shoe Machinery Corp., supra n. i at 36o. See Heininger,
supra n. 22 at 378-79.
34 See e.g., United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., supra n. x; Zenith Ra-
dio Corporation of America, supra n. 15; American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Pow-
der Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1962).
85 American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., supra n. 34 at 88.
36 See Garrison v. General Motors Corp., supra n. 18 at 52o.
37 Haight, Keeping the Privilege Inside the Corporation, 18, Bus. LAW. 551 (1963);
Maurer, supra n. 1o, at 385; Burnham, supra n. 16 at 543-44; Heininger, supra n. 22
at 383-84.
38 The Alcoa case provides an example. The president of the corporation an-
ticipated the informational demands of the attorney and wrote to an employee to
secure information prior to consulting the attorney. The attorney then requested
the president to provide the exact information. The employee wrote to the presi-
dent with a copy to the lawyer. The court rules that the original request from the
president was not privileged and the letter from the employee to the president was
not privileged. If the attorney had written to the president, the privilege would
apparently been recognized. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp.
251 (N.D. N.Y. 196o) discussed in Heininger, supra n. 22 at 385-86.
89 Austern, Corporate Counsel Communication: Is Anybody Listening, 17 Bus.
LAW 868, 871 (1962).
40 Ibid.
41 American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., supra u. 34.
42 Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 28o F. Supp. ioi8 (N.D. Ala. 1968).




The relationship between counsel and employees of a corporation may
well be the most interesting and confusing area of attorney-client privilege.
In the famous case of Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association,1
the question of whether there is such a thing as a corporate privilege was
hopefully settled once and for all. But despite this case, various factors have
caused the courts to dilute the corporate privilege; and recently a new prob-
lem with far-reaching implications has gained attention. On February 21,
1968, the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama in Garner v.
Wolfinbargar, 28o Fed Supp ioi8, held that in a suit brought by sharehold-
ers against a corporation and its directors, the corporation-defendant cannot
claim the attorney-client privilege. Although the opinion of the court does
not relate the factual background of the case, I understand that the case
involves both a class action of the shareholders suing as individuals against
the corporation and its directors, and a derivative action by shareholders.
The complaint apparently alleges fraudulent sales of the corporation's se-
curities, harming the corporation and the shareholders. The decision by the
District Court resulted from a motion by plaintiffs for the production of
documents.
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The District Court relied on two English Chancery cases, one decided in
1888 and the other in 1943. Both English cases were class actions by share-
holders against the corporation. The Chancery Court applied the rules gov-
erning the relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary to the relation-
ship between a corporation and its shareholders. In the earlier English case,
the court'stated that a trustee could not resist disclosure to a beneficiary of
any documents, including attorney-client communications, obtained by funds
of the trustee; and that the same rule should apply to disclosure of documents
by a corporation to its shareholders.
In the later English case, dealing with the accountant-client privilege in
England, the Chancery Court stated that a beneficiary was entitled to see any
opinions submitted and taken by a trustee in the ordinary course of admin-
istration of a trust, and that shareholders had a similar right.
At least one thing can be said in favor of the English cases: They did not
misstate the law of trusts. In his Treatise on Trusts, Scott states that a trustee
is under a duty to allow beneficiaries complete rights of inspection, includ-
ing opinions of counsel procurred by the trustee to guide him in the admin-
istration of the trust.
There is also ample precedent both in the case law and in treatises com-
paring the duty of a director or officer of a corporation to that of a trustee.
However, despite the recognized similarities between the law of trusts and
the law of corporations the leading writers have also recognized that there
are differences between the two bodies of law-and differences which must
be recognized. Fletcher, on corporations, states as follows:
"It is unfortunate ... that the courts should even have attempted
to classify directors either as trustees or as agents or both .... It would
have been much better to have worked out the rules governing their
duties and liabilities according to the nature of the particular office
and the nature of the particular duty or liability involved, without
regard to the rules either of trust or agency. . .. A director, strictly
speaking, is neither a trustee or an agent: he resembles both. In some
respects, the rules relating to trustees are applicable to him and in
some respects they are not.... Whether in a given case the rule appli-
cable to trustees or the rule applicable to agents, or neither of such
rules, is applicable, is determined by no fast rule, but depends almost
entirely upon the nature of the particular act or contract which is the
subject of the controversy."
State corporation statutes also make it plain that the law of trusts does not
carry over lock, stock and barrel to the law of corporations. These statutes
limit the circumstances under which shareholders can inspect corporate rec-
ords and the types of records that shareholders can inspect. For example, in
both New York and New Jersey, the law confines the right of inspection to
limited records of account, minutes of shareholders and directors, and rec-
ords containing the names and addresses and other information concerning
shareholders.
Notwithstanding the recognized differences between the law of trusts and
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the law of corporations, however, we are faced with the decision of the Ala-
bama court, which apparently draws no distinction in the circumstances of
that case.
It is uncomforting to note that Garner v. Wolfinbarger is not alone. In
January of 1967, the Supreme Court of Colorado limited the accountant-
client privliege, recognized by Colorado statute, as follows, and I quote:
"Certified public accountants hired by a corporation are hired for
the benefit of all of its stockholders, and such employment forbids
concealment from the stockholders of information given the account-
ant by the corporation."
In addition, a more recent case even than Garner v. Wolfinbarger, entitled
Fisher v. Wolfinbarger, was decided by the District Court of Kentucky in
December of 1968, denying the privilege to the defendant corporation. The
plaintiff in both Wolfinbarger cases is represented by the same attorney, and
the two cases are related. The Kentucky court was apparently faced with the
same question facing the Alabama court, and decided the issue the same
way.
I should note at this point that the order of the Court in Garner v. Wolfin-
barger has been appealed to the Court of Appeals for the 5 th Circuit, and
briefs have been filed, including an amicus brief by the American Bar
Association.
If, however, the lower court order is let to stand, the implications for the
privilege in the corporate setting could be most serious. A literal adoption
of the law of trusts to the law of corporations in this area could presumably
make attorney-client communications available to stockholders in more than
just a class action or derivative suit. Any outside adversary suing the cor-
poration, who happened to own one or more shares of stock, could claim
access to privileged material. Such a result would effectively eliminate the
attorney-client privilege for the corporation.
But even if Wolfinbarger, and other like cases, are interpreted only to
allow discovery of privileged communications in class actions by sharehold-
ers against corporations or in derivative suits, the potential consequences are
still alarming. The corporation may suffer great harm by the disclosure of
privileged communications. Information thus disclosed can be used by out-
siders in subsequent law suits. The derivative or class action may even be
a thinly veiled means of securing such information for an ulterior purpose.
It is not a satisfactory answer to say that even if future harm may occur
to the corporation, the shareholders ought to have the right to harm what is
really their alter ego. This argument presupposes that one group of stock-
holders represents the feelings, or the best interests, of the rest of the stock-
holders. This is not so. In fact, the active plaintiffs in a derivative action may
well have social and economic interests far apart from other shareholders.
It is possible, in fact, that the active plaintiffs have connections with more
than one corporation, and are, therefore, in a position of conflict of interest.
Consequently, when a group of shareholders initiates a class action or
derivative action, it cannot be said that the interest of this group justifies the
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potential harm resulting from exposure to the public of the corporation's
attorney-client communications.
I recognize that in a class action against a corporation-and almost always
in derivative actions-directors and officers are defendants. Consequently,
it can be argued that even if the corporation has a privilege, the individual
defendants do not. However, the corporation's privilege, if it exists, does not
depend on whether it is a real party defendant in the law suit. And to be
at all meaningful, the corporation's privilege must be asserted by its board
of directors-even if those directors are defendants in the law suit.
I should also at this time point out my disagreement with the position that
because a director or officer receives advice as a corporate employee, that he
is therefore unable to claim a personal privilege. Although a director or offi-
cer in receiving and seeking advice from house counsel or outside counsel is
doing so as an employee, the actions which he takes after such advice, or the
communications he makes to the attorney, may well subject him to personal
liability. This personal liability may be of such a nature that the corporation
cannot indemnify him, under existing statutes, by-laws of the corporation,
or under common law standards of public policy.
Furthermore, disclosure of the officer's or director's communications can
conceivably result in criminal proceedings against that person as an individ-
ual. Lastly, the officer or director faces a loss of reputation which may be
equally damaging to his life.
It does not suffice to say that the corporate officer or director must sacrifice
his security against such loss, if he is to accept a fiduciary position. Every law
suit alleges some breach of duty which the defendant had toward the plain-
tiff. In a suit brought by one individual against another, the wrong alleged
may just as easily be some sort of malfeasance, or breach of relationship,
which has resulted in financial loss to the plaintiff. Yet, there seems to be
some reluctance to protect the corporate officer, as opposed to the individual
businessman. To the extent such a reluctance reflects less faith in the cor-
porate officer, such reluctance is ill-founded.
I would like briefly to touch on some of the other problems facing cor-
porate lawyers in the matter of attorney-client privilege. Firstly, are lawyers
within a corporation more likely than outside counsel to include business
considerations in their legal advice? Courts may approach this question with
suspicion. I believe that in being suspicious the courts err. A lawyer, in pri-
vate practice or as house counsel, must have regard for business consequences
of his advice, or he is not doing his job properly. A proper view was taken
by Judge Wyzanski in U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation,2 in which
he stated:
"The modern lawyer almost invariably advises his client not only
what is permissive but also what is desirable, and it is in the business
interest that the lawyer should regard himself as more than predicter
of legal consequences. His duty to society as well as to his client in-
volves many relevant social, economic, and political considerations.
And the privilege of non-disclosure is not lost merely because relevant
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non-legal considerations are expressly stated in a communication
which also includes legal advice."
It can be said that since a corporate lawyer is erroneously suspected by
some courts as being more of a businessman than a lawyer, it behooves him
to be particularly careful not to render written opinions which appear to
mix "business" advice with "legal" advice. On the other hand, it can be said
that a detailed knowledge of the facts and business considerations can often
result in better legal advice.
The second problem involves defining what is the corporation-i.e. what
employees can speak for the corporation, and receive advice for the corpora-
tion, within the cloak of the privilege. Several cases have limited the privi-
lege to communications between counsel and employees who are members
of the so-called "control group." 3 The control group is defined as that group
having the authority to control or substantially participate in a decision to
be taken on the advice of the lawyer. The fact that such a test can lead to
disturbing results is shown by one case, Garrison v. General Motors Corpora-
tion,4 where the court found that a Division Manager and his assistant, the
Chief Engineer, were members of a control group, but that a Senior Project
Engineer and an Assistant Chief Engineer were not. It would seem that a
more proper approach would be that any employee of a corporation, acting
within the scope of his job in seeking advice, should be able to communicate
with a lawyer, and enjoy the same privilege of non-disclosure. The value in
maintaining the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship is equal
in both circumstances.
The third problem is that of determining the subjects upon which house
counsel may base privileged opinions. In United States v. United Shoe Ma-
chinery Corporation,5 Judge Wyzanski stated that the privilege does not
apply to opinions by attorneys commenting on information coming from
outside the corporation or from public documents. It would indeed be un-
fortunate if the attorney could not comment in confidence on a "public docu-
ment," in the context of a specific confidential question from a specific
employee. But the rule stated by Judge Wyzanski might mean that he cannot.
Wyzanski's decision poses particularly difficult problems for in-house patent
attorneys giving opinions on patents.
Going further with the problem of the subjects on which house counsel can
render privileged opinions-one of the peculiarities of the corporate lawyer's
job is that he seeks out the subjects on which to give opinions. It is very pos-
sible-though regrettable-that the corporate lawyer may not be protected in
giving such opinions that are, so to speak, not "sought." The cases commonly
state that the privilege only covers communications based on facts of which
the attorney was informed by his client, for the purpose of securing legal
advice.
Personally, I feel that it is a mistake to discourage lawyers in corporate
legal departments from smelling out problems; and I also feel it is a mistake
to discourage corporate lawyers from writing memoranda to one another,
within the legal department. Frankness in both types of communications is
necessary, if the corporation is to follow a proper legal path. The lawyers'
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opinions, if disclosed, may implicate other people; and therefore, protection
from disclosure is most important.
I will not discuss privilege insofar as patent attorneys' advice is concerned.
I would like to revert to the Garner case again to mention some collateral
points.
There is a fair degree of probability that either federal or state criminal
statutes might be involved in connection with the Garner litigation. Even if
the Court holds that a corporation has no privilege and cannot avail itself of
the right against self-incrimination, there will be individuals who may very
well be incriminated by compulsory discovery of counsel's opinion. Whether
these issues will be clearly defined and answered by the Circuit Court will
depend upon their decision on the basic question of corporate privilege. If
that is denied, a whole host of collateral issues arise.
In conclusion, therefore, onc may say that the confidence of corporate
counsel in the outcome of the Radiant Burners case is being shaken and we
await with baited breath the decision in the Fifth Circuit Garner case.
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MR. WITHROW
The modern law concerning the corporate client privilege is less than 20
years old. Judge Wyzanski in a separate opinion set forth his analysis'in the
course of ruling on the admissibility of about 8oo exhibits offered by govern-
ment counsel and objected to by United Shoe Machinery.1 Since that opinion
in 1950, courts have been engaged primarily in refining Judge Wyzanski's
approach.
The question of the corporate privilege usually arises as an evidentiary
point in important litigation. As a result the courts perhaps have not spent
as much effort in writing opinions on this problem as we would like. Ac-
tually, we know that in most instances no opinion is written or recorded. It
also happens that most of the reported decisions relate to rulings by a trial
judge sitting without a jury. This was the situation in the United Shoe case.
So we have the court examining the documents to determine the question of
privilege, and trying the case on the merits. In most instances, the court can
easily protect itself from committing reversible error no matter what its rul-
ing. Of course, if the privilege is overruled, the confidentiality is gone for-
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ever, and this might be held to eliminate the possibility of asserting the
privilege in a future case.
In the context of evidentiary rulings or discovery proceedings it seems that
most courts are too preoccupied to appreciate fully that the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is to permit a person to explore his problems with
his attorney and obtain trained legal advice. Every person, whether an indi-
vidual or a corporation, needs the opportunity to engage in this dialogue in
absolutely protected confidence.
The client is entitled to learn from his lawyer the strengths and weaknesses
of his position. Indeed, it is the lawyer's obligation to present during this
private dialogue the arguments against our client for his confidential con-
sideration. This obligation is less well understood than our function of pre-
senting in public hearings the arguments for our clients. Both are equally
strong and imperative.
This dialogue between the client and his lawyer should be jealously pro-
tected for two reasons:
First: To encourage the client to freely divulge all the facts to his lawyer
without fear of being prejudiced by their subsequent disclosure, and
Second: To discourage litigation which often arises when, because of a
failure to disclose essential facts, a lawyer and his client remain adamant on
issues where the law has already been clearly resolved.
Too often, this dialogue between a client and his attorney is thought of
in terms of criminal law-as an adjunct to the 5 th Amendment. As you all
recall it was just in this area that Judge Campbell got himself off on the
wrong track in the Radiant Burners Inc. In this he was soundly reversed by
the 7 th Circuit (32o F.2d 314, 322-23, 1963)-which said
"... the attorney-client privilege derives from a regard for the
rights of a client, personal or impersonal in character, fostering a social
policy concerned with facilitating the workings of justice."
Indeed, the appellate court held that no good reason exists why the impartial
administration of Justice should not afford a corporation the protection of
the privilege.
Nevertheless, it appears that the corporate privilege seems to be circum-
scribed by the concept "if it is really appropriate or necessary." Protecting
the privilege often appears to be merely obstruction to full and free dis-
covery. Faced with such a conflict courts tend to rule in favor of what one
judge called the "overriding interest in full disclosure." 2
Despite such inroads the privilege still has considerable vitality-in all
probability, substantially more now than it appeared to have just ten years
ago. This does not mean that full discovery can be thwarted by the assertion
of the privilege; it does mean that in most instances, where the attorney is
asked for and is supplying legal advice, the dialogue between management
and counsel will be protected.
As lawyers, all of us have probably damaged the efficacy of the privilege.
Every Rule 34 Motion, C.I.D. and Grand Jury subpoena (and their state
court equivalents) tempts us to assert that every document to or from an
attorney is privileged. As attorneys we perform a great many more functions
than dispensing legal advice-and consequently the privilege does not apply
to much that we do. It certainly does not apply to the vast number of the
documents we write and even less to the much larger number that come to
our attention.
Nevertheless, in the context of litigation both the corporation and its trial
counsel would like to protect much more than the attorney-client privilege
was ever intended to cover. This is a natural reaction to protect whatever
can be protected from disclosure.
Three important areas where we try to extend the privilege are: patents
and patent licensing; business advice; and material prepared in connection
with litigation.
These areas present slightly different facets of the problem of corporate
privilege.
The most unsettled of these areas is concerned with patents, patent appli-
cations and licensing. This is an area of quite conflicting results with some
courts being heavily influenced by whether the attorney is on the corporate
staff or serving as outside counsel.
Most of the cases can be reconciled on the basis of the answer to a single
question of fact-What was the patent lawyer really doing? Was he advising
on the law, or merely preparing legal and factual documents in connection
with patent applications, patent proceedings or licensing programs?
A patent attorney (corporate or independent) usually first comes into the
picture when the inventor (or his superior) submits the details of the inven-
tion and asks if it is patentable. If the resultant opinion expresses an opinion
on the law, then the opinion and the "legal-factual" research on which it is
based, clearly should be privileged.
Patent lawyers at this point often seem prone to comment more upon the
commercial value of the patent which might issue than upon whether as a
matter of legal analysis it should be granted. This comment standing alone
probably would not be privileged. On the other hand, this expression might
of necessity so involve advice concerning mixed questions of law and business
judgment that the privilege ought not to be jeopardized.
Once the basic legal question of patent-ability is answered, it would seem
that the patent lawyer is rarely called upon to give legal advice. The applica-
tions, drawings, proceedings before the Patent Office may all be lawyer's work
-but not of the type associated with the attorney-client privilege. Certain of
this may be protected as trade secrets, and of course, there may be opinions
concerning strategy and procedure prior to the issuance of the patent which
would be protected.
Procedures in the Patent Office are such that patent counsel (both inside
and out) are actually working for the individual inventor rather than the
corporation until the patent has actually issued. This raises the question as
to whose privilege are we talking about-the inventor's or the corporation's?
With employee's changing jobs as often as they do today this might become
of crucial importance. Judge Leahy in the Zenith case held that the corpora-
tion was the client, and therefore had the privilege.3
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Once a patent is issued-patent counsel may be asked if someone is in-
fringing. As we will see later the form of counsel's reply may well determine
whether the privilege can be made to stand up in court. This may be a ques-
tion of law, or fact, or a mixed question.
Most of a lawyer's work on a patent licensing program clearly would not
be privileged, although he is employing his legal skills and judgments. At
the inception of a program, counsel could well be asked as to its legality-as
well as the legality of certain concepts in a license. These certainly could re-
sult in privileged opinions.
As we will see later this limited number of general situations for inside
patent counsel to give legal advice has led some courts to at least appear to
deny the existence of the attorney-client privilege in this entire area. It is
submitted that such an approach is manifestly improper on the basis of legal
theory.
We now turn to the area of business advice. It is clear that business advice
is not protected by the privilege just because it is given by a lawyer. Since
an attorney is today called upon to do much more than express cut-and-dried
opinions as to the law, there is often a real question as to what advice should
be protected. Judge Wyzanski seemed to sense this when he said in United
Shoe:
"The modern lawyer almost invariably advises his client upon not
only what is permissible but also what is desirable. And it is in the
public interest that the lawyer should regard himself as more than
predicter of legal consequences." 4
Judge Wyzanski's statement lends some encouragement to the hope that per-
haps the privilege might be somewhat extended. The cases indicate, of course,
that the problem in reality is how to do so in the framework of communica-
tions concerning "legal advice" from a "legal adviser."
Court opinions (as well as ruling from the bench) indicate that this subject
of attorney-client privilege is an area where form seems to triumph over sub-
stance. An example of this is found in the court's assuming that when the
lawyer asks his clients for factual material it is for the purpose of rendering
a legal opinion, with the result that the request and the reply are privi-
leged.5 I could find no comparable assumption when the information was
volunteered.
To the extent that such a presumption is indulged in by the courts (and
it has been) certain communications bordering on pure business may be
cloaked by the fact that the attorney asked for business materials. It would
seem, however, that the party seeking production of this requested material
should have the opportunity to rebut any such presumption that it was to
aid the attorney in preparing his legal advice.
To put this in a practical context it would probably be easier to sustain
the privilege under the following sequence:
(i) Client: "Do you think I've violated the Sherman Act?"
(2) Attorney: "Show me what you've done recently."
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(3) Client (having accumulated the data): "Here's a compilation of our
recent business."
It would be more difficult were the client to send the attorney a copy of
the factual letter or memorandum, thereby making only an implied request
for legal comment should counsel choose to make any.
In view of the remarks by both speakers and particularly by Mr. Brereton
concerning the problems engendered by the Garner case6 I shall pass over
this area of the privilege concerning material prepared in that context or for
specific litigation. It would be impossible to pursue this area any further
without a detailed discussion of the work product rule, the basic protection
in this area, a subject more for trial lawyers than most corporate law depart-
ments. Suffice it to say the much cited case of Hickman v. Taylor is the touch-
stone which provides what help there is aside from the privilege itself. In
most courts this is weak protection indeed.
One problem frequently faced by litigants is that of protecting communi-
cations of experts who compile data for presentation at trial. If the fruits of
the experts' labor are clearly earmarked for transmission to an attorney pur-
suant to his request, in order that he might render an opinion or prepare his
case, there may be some hope of gaining protection of the privilege. How-
ever, to date the courts have found it all too easy to override any claim of
privilege in this area.
Corporate Law Departments, I assume, periodically review their proce-
dures from the dual point of view of making their advice more effective and
of protecting the privilege wherever possible. To a certain extent, the two
goals may be at cross-purposes.
To be effective, communications to and from the "lawyers" seem to require
broad distribution within the company. Yet this very practice has caused
courts to hold that documents, whose confidentiality was not jealously safe-
guarded, were not privileged. 7 Indeed, some cases raise grave doubts as to
whether any document contained in the general files of a corporation. Un-
fortunately, the converse is not true-a document does not become privi-
leged by virtue of being only in the Legal Department or in a lawyer's files.
Handling documents in the requisite "highly confidential" manner often
presents a very difficult problem. It is simple enough in the case of the formal
legal opinion, if properly written as to form and content. A court would be
hard pressed to rule against the privilege when the opinion clearly covers the
following four points:
i. Addresses someone in the "control group."
2. Recites that the lawyer has been asked for a legal opinion as to the
specific proposal.
3. Discusses the applicable statutes and case law.
4. Expresses basically a legal conclusion.
Corporate executives seem to have little occasion (or inclination) to breach
the confidentiality of such an opinion letter by overcirculating the opinion
or by showing it to third parties.
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Legal opinions of less formal character can be more easily protected as
they approach this format. To the extent that the aura of legal advice can be
imparted to a document, the privilege is more likely to be sustained. Indeed,
a failure to pay attention to form may well result in a dissipation of what
should be privileged.
To the extent that it is impossible for the lawyer to divorce legal advice
from business advice, the privilege is in jeopardy. When it is possible to dis-
cuss them in separate memoranda this should be done. If it isn't feasible to
separate advice in this manner, then nonprivileged material should be sep-
arated as much as possible so that the court may protect such parts as are
privileged.
The attorney can also be of help in other ways. The wording of the advice
may itself be controlling. As one court remarked after quoting extensively
from the attorney's document in question:
"This is more than attorney-talk. It is big-as well as basic-business
diction." 8
The court was impressed by the diction, in other words, the manner in which
the advice was worded. It would not be surprising to find that a discussion
of patent problems would not be protected when couched in terms of what
patents the client owns compared to those of its competitors but that it would
be protected if couched in terms of a legal analysis of "infringement" possi-
bilities. Similarly, discussions of business plans would probably be privileged
if set forth in terms of considerations under the antitrust laws rather than as
general comments on plans for expanding operations.
Indeed, the conclusion is inescapable that the more an attorney acts like
a lawyer and his dealings appear to be oriented to the rendering of legal
advice, the better the chance that the privilege will be sustained.
Turning now to the problem of the privilege for documents prepared by
the client. The general rule is simple enough: Those documents which were
prepared "with a bona fide intention" of being laid before a lawyer for his
legal advice are privileged.9
To this one could add that parts of a client's document may be privileged
if it in reality is repeating the legal advice received from an attorney.10 Of
course, this is only true if the confidentiality of such a document has been
maintained.
I have heard it argued by lawyers in private practice that the privilege is
one which should attach only to their communications with a corporation.
This just is not correct as a matter of case law or of legal theory. The basic
question is the nature of the services performed. If they are professional serv-
ices involving the rendering of expert legal opinions, it should make no
difference whether the communication was by an attorney on the staff of the
corporation or by a member of the private bar.
Actually this area of the law has been clarified in recent years in favor of
house counsel. Even Judge Wyzanski's apparent requirement of membership
in the bar of their residence has been relaxed. It is today only one of the
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factors to be considered in connection with the question of whether the attor-
ney was "acting as a lawyer."-It is not a sine qua non.11
The "bar membership in the jurisdiction of residence" test originated with
Judge Wyzanski when he was considering whether an attorney was "acting
as a lawyer" in the context of the corporate patent department of United
Shoe (89 F.Supp. at 360). The harsh rule which he espoused was rejected by
Judge Leahy in the Zenith case (12 1 F.Supp. 792, 794). In that case the court
in painstaking fashion delineated the two spheres of a patent lawyer's work
and decided to honor the privilege where legal advice was given. 2 The Su-
preme Court in a dictum in Sperry v. Florida13 seems to have adopted an
even more liberal approach than the Zenith case.
It is only fair to say, however, that the courts have accorded greater attor-
ney-client protection to the work of the independent patent lawyer. The
basis has been the belief that the outside lawyer is more concerned with the
purely legal aspects of patent work while house counsel perform more rou-
tine work. Even if this were so, it should not be the criterion in the context
of whether a document is privileged. A few recent cases in Delaware and
Michigan (Sperti Products, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.14 and Chore-Time Equip-
ment, Inc. v. Big Dutchman'5 ) have been cited as though they would con-
clusively deny the possibility of the attorney-client privilege to a corporate
patent counsel. While these cases would impose a heavy burden to sustain
such a privilege, the courts in reality coupled the fact of being house patent
counsel "with the contents of the communications themselves." However, it
would appear that the federal district courts in California, Wisconsin and
New York are more liberal in sustaining the privilege, 16 than Delaware or
Michigan would be.
At least one case has adopted a third alternative-to wit, no privilege for
patent lawyers except when there is a controversy in a court of record.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Gentex Corp., 153 U.S.P.Q. iio (D. Del.
1967).
These divergent decisions underscore the tough road that patent lawyers
face in the area of attorney-client privilege primarily because the courts tend
to think that patent practice is essentially business oriented.' 7
It behooves members of the Patent Bar to make certain that their legal
advice is in the form which has all the hallmarks of a legal opinion.
Perhaps we should not be surprised at finding this confusion in patent
cases. Infringement and patent validity suits are routinely before a single
judge who also will generally rule on questions of privilege. The court quite
properly concludes that he will not be prejudiced by what he reads even
though it is privileged. Furthermore, it would seem that few, if any, privi-
leged documents should materially affect issues of validity or infringement.
On the other hand, in the context of treble-damages cases in the patent field,
real prejudice might result from denying the privilege to the corporate pa-
tent lawyer.
As I indicated earlier an important factor affecting problems or privilege
is the work load of the courts. With judges feeling as harassed as they do, the
wholesale assertion of the attorney-client privilege seems to result inevitably
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in the court's refusal to rule on a document by document basis. The trial
court may on the one hand set up general guidelines for counsel. In the in-
terests of full discovery these guidelines will of necessity impinge on the
privilege. As a second alternative some courts permit opposing counsel to
see these documents and leave the issue of privilege until the time of trial.
To avoid either of these unsatisfactory alternatives dictated by the court,
the client and his lawyer can adopt one of the following approaches:
i. Assert the privilege only as to those relatively few documents which
clearly meet the tests laid down by the courts.
2. Waive the privilege wherever its assertion is not in an area of ex-
treme importance to the client, having in mind that waiver has
some rather important consequences.
3. Work out a procedure with opposing counsel, with the court's ap-
proval, if feasible, by which he may examine all the documents
under an agreement that this does not constitute a waiver of the
privilege.
No doubt this later procedure protects the privilege as between these par-
ties. I query what would be the result as to a third person in another pro-
ceeding. With the court's desire to encourage solutions to such mechanical
problems as reviewing numerous documents, they may well decide there has
been no waiver-but apparently there have been no cases to date ruling on
this question.'S
The area of the corporate attorney-client privilege does not appear to be
one which lends itself to scholarly treatment. Rather it is an area where the
extent and scope of the privilege and, indeed, even its very existence often
times depends on form rather than substance and invariably on factual de-
terminations. As a result this attorney-client privilege when litigated will
always be caught in the cross-fire between full and free discovery and the
reluctance of harassed judges to fully consider its proper scope and function.
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